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COMMENTS
Illegal Transactions
An illegal transaction is one that contravenes some positive
law, statute or charter, or is against public policy.29 "The courts
sometimes fail to note the difference between ultra vires and il-
legal contracts, and apply the rules relating to the effect of ultra
vires contracts to contracts either expressly prohibited or against
public policy, without in any way noticing the distinction. '30
While it may be said that all illegal acts are ultra vires3' the
converse is certainly not true.
It would appear to be axiomatic that an illegal transaction
entered into by the board of directors cannot be ratified by a
majority of the shareholders3 2 so as to prevent a minority share-
holder from obtaining relief.33 Indeed, there can be no ratification
of an illegal transaction that will render it enforceable.34
No Louisiana cases have been found which have application
to the above situations. It seems likely that the Louisiana courts
will treat an ultra vires transaction as one legal in its inception
and beyond the authority of the corporation rather than one in
which the corporation has no power to perform, in view of Sec-
tion 12, I, of the Louisiana Business Corporation Act. 35 With re-
gard to voidable and illegal transactions, presumably the Louisi-
ana courts will follow the majority decisions of the various com-
mon law state courts, that is, that voidable transactions may be
ratified by a majority of the shareholders and that illegal trans-
actions cannot be ratified at all.
DONALD J. ZADECK
JURISDICTION OVER INTERSTATE HOMICIDES
As a general proposition it is true that the criminal law of a
state has no extraterritorial operation.' In view of the compli-
29. Staacke v. Routledge, 111 Tex. 489, 241 S.W. 994 (1922).
30. 7 Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. (perm. ed. 1931) § 3582.
31. Eckhart v. Heier, 38 S.D. 524, 162 N.W. 150 (1917).
32. Von Arnim v. American Tube Works, 188 Mass. 515, 74 N.E. 680
(1905); Commonwealth v. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R., 111
Va. 611, 69 S.E. 1070 (1911).
33. Forrester v. B. & M. Consol. Copper & Silver Min. Co., 21 Mont.
544, 55 Pac. 229 (1898).
34. Cartwright v. Albuquerque Hotel Co., 36 N.M. 189, 11 P.(2d) 261
(1932); Runcie v. Corn Exchange Bank Trust Co., 6 N.Y.S.(2d) 616 (1938);
Baird v. McDaniel Printing Co., 25 Tenn. App. 144, 148, 153 S.W.(2d) 135,
138 (1941), in which the court pointed out that "Corporate transactions
which are illegal because prohibited by statute are void, and cannot support
an action nor become enforceable by performance, ratification, or estoppel."
35. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 12, I [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1092, I].
1. See Marshal v. Nebraska, 6 Neb. 120, 29 Am. Rep. 363 (1877).
State v. Chapin, 17 Ark. 561 (1856); Beattie v. State, 73 Ark. 428, 84 S.W.
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cated nature of some of the jurisdictional problems that may
arise, it would be unwise to give unconditional acceptance to this
rule of law. Criminals have respect for political boundaries only
insofar as those boundaries are an aid in effecting their criminal
purposes. 2
A nice jurisdictional problem is presented when A, standing
in Louisiana, fires a shot at B in Texas; B is badly wounded and
is taken to a hospital in Arkansas, where he expires. Which state
or states have jurisdiction over the crime? To constitute murder
there must be an intent to kill, an act pursuant to that intent, an
injury inflicted, and the resulting death.3 A brief analysis of the
hypothetical facts shows that in no one state are all of these con-
stituent elements present. The intent and the defendant's physical
act, the pulling of the trigger, occurs in Louisiana, the injury is
inflicted in Texas and the resulting death occurs in Arkansas.
It is fundamental that jurisdiction in criminal matters rests
solely in the courts of the state or country in which the crime is
committed,4 but the laws of each state or country exclusively
determine whether given conduct is or is not criminal. 5 The na-
tionality or citizenship of the offender is immaterial. He is sub-
ject in all respects to the law of the country or state within which
the crime was committed.6
When only the defendant's act and criminal intent appear in
477 (1904); Simpson v. State, 92 Ga. 41, 17 S.E. 984 (1893); Johns v. State,
19 Ind. 421 (1862); State v. Wyckoff, 31 N.J. Law 65 (1864); Ex parte McNeely,
36 W.Va. 84, 14 S.E. 436, 15 L.R.A. 226 (1892).
See A.L.I., Restatement and Commentaries on Conflict of Laws (1931)
465-469.
2. This fact was recognized long before the turn of the century. Francis
Wharton wrote: "The great discoveries of recent days, by which the ob-
stacles of space are surmounted, call for a reconsideration of our old con-
ceptions of criminal jurisdiction. . . . Now, however, there is scarcely a
business transaction which is not more or less affected by information con-
veyed instantaneously from a foreign land; information as to which fraud
is always possible, and concerned in the concoction or transmission of which
there may be always persons, resident in other countries, who may do acts
violating the penal laws of the country in which the information is to
operate." Wharton, Conflict of Criminal Laws (1880) 1 Cr. L. Mag. 689.
3. At common law a concurrence of the place of the death and the place
of the stroke was necessary in order to confer jurisdiction upon the court.
State v. McCoy, 8 Rob. 545 (La. 1844).
4. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 13 S.Ct. 224, 36 L.Ed. 1123 (1892);
Brown v. United States, 35 App. Cas. 548, 22 Ann. Cas. 1912A,388 (D.C. 1910);
Stewart v. Jessup, 51 Ind. 413, 19 Am. Rep. 739 (1875); State v. Kelly, 76
Me. 331, 49 Am. Rep. 620 (1884); People v. Devine, 185 Mich. 50, 151 N.W.
646 (1915); State v. Kief, 12 Mont. 92, 29 Pac. 654 (1892); State v. Cutshall,
110 N.C. 538, 15 S.E. 261 (1892); State v. Hall, 114 N.C. 909, 19 S.E. 602
(1894); Ex parte McNeely, 36 W.Va. 84, 14 S.E. 436 (1892).
5. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 13 S.Ct. 224, 36 L.Ed. 1123 (1892).
6. State v. Chapin, 17 Ark. 561, 65 Am. Dec. 452 (1856),; Reg. v. Anderson,
L.R., 1 C.C. 161, 8 Eng. Rul. Cas. 1 (1868).
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this state the Louisiana courts are confronted with a jurisdic-
tional problem which is not specifically covered by the Louisiana
Code of Criminal Procedure. In the absence of statutory author-
ity, Louisiana courts are justified in looking to the common law
for a guide to determine the rule of law to be applied.7 In the
leading case of State v. Hall,8 the North Carolina court refused to
exercise jurisdiction over a person who fired a shot from that
state killing a person in Tennessee. The court held, that in the
absence of a pertinent statute, the state in which the blow was
received had exclusive jurisdiction over the offender. The Louisi-
ana court has also held that the place where the fatal blow was
received has jurisdiction over the offender.9 In cases relating to
venue the Louisiana court has taken a contrary view with re-
gards to libel published through a newspaper 10 and to a threaten-
ing message transmitted over a telephone." In these cases the
Louisiana Supreme Court held, without citing any common law
authority, that the crime is completed where the act is initiated
and not where it is consummated. This may show a tendency of
Louisiana courts to focus more attention upon the offender than
upon the completed act. Since these cases relate solely to venue
12
it is questionable whether or not their application will be ex-
tended to interstate crime. Louisiana law on this subject is un-
settled, and a statute may be necessary to enable Louisiana to
exercise jurisdiction over the offender.
Courts frequently stress what they call the gist of the offense,
that is, those elements of a given crime without which the exist-
ence of that crime cannot be demonstrated. In reaching a con-
clusion the courts constantly refer back to the Eiglish territorial
doctrine which stressed the situs of the stroke. 1 This doctrine
7. See Comment (1931) 6 Tulane L. Rev. 135.
8. 114 N.C. 909, 19 S.E. 602, 28 L.R.A. 59 (1894).
9. State v. McCoy, 8 Rob. 545 (La. 1844).
10. State v. Moore, 140 La. 281, 72 So. 965 (1916), held that the place
where the paper was published and sent out was the proper place for trial,
not where the paper was read, and the damage done.
11. Defendant, while in New Orleans, telephoned the prosecuting witness
who was in St. Bernard Parish, threatening to murder him. Court held the
proper venue to be the place where the defendant was standing at the time
he made the call. State v. Galliclo, 170 La. 954, 129 So. 541 (1930).
12. Art. 13, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928: "All trials shall take place in
the parish in which the offense shall have been committed, unless the venue
be changed; provided that where the several acts constituting a crime shall
have been committed in more than one parish, the offender may be tried in
any parish where a substantial element of the crime has been committed."
It will be noted that venue refers merely to the place within a state
where a trial is to be held, whereas jurisdiction refers to the inherent
power of a court to try a particular case. Art. 10, La. Code of Crim. Proc.
of 1928.
13. State v. Hall, 114 N.C. 909, 917, 19 S.E. 602, 604 (1894). The court
19491
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originated at a time when the means of bringing about death
were not as numerous or as far reaching as the methods existent
today.
The crime of murder may be committed through the medium
of an innocent agent such as a bullet,'1 4 the United States mail, 15
or a person.' Where such an object is set in motion outside of a
state the courts within the state have usually employed the fiction
that the offender is constructively present in the offended state.
17
.
To adopt the principle of constructive presence means that the
offender, his acts, and their consequences must be brought into
the territory by means of a judicial fiction. This fiction has been
most frequently used in cases where poisons or explosives 8 were
sent through the mails, where money was obtained through false
pretenses, 9 and where there has been libel through the publica-
tion of a newspaper or other periodical. 20 The majority of the
said, ". . . it can not be doubted that the place of the assault or stroke in
the present case was in Tennessee; and it is also clear that the offense
of murder at common law was committed within the jurisdiction of that
state." In Simpson v. State, 92 Ga. 41, 17 S.E. 984 (1893), the court localized
the crime at the place where the bullet struck, by bringing the defendant
into the state on the theory of constructive presence.
14. Simpson v. State, 92 Ga. 41, 17 S.E. 984 (1893); State v. Hall, 114
N,C. 909, 19 S.E. 602 (1894).
15. Poisoned candy was sent by the defendant in California to the victim
in Delaware. Having statutory authority, the California court took jurisdic-
tion over the offense. People v. Botkin, 132 Calif. 231, 64 Pac. 286 (1901).
16. People v. Adams, 3 Denio (N.Y.) 190, 45 Am. Dec. 468 (1846), where
it was held that the courts of New York had jurisdiction of the offense
of obtaining money by false pretense, committed within the state by a
non-resident, through an innocent agent, although the guilty party was not
at the time of the offense within the state.
In Commissioner v. White, 123 Mass. 430, 25 Am. Rep. 116 (1877), it was
held that although a thief had acted through the person of an innocent
agent, and had not himself been present in the state of the theft, he could
nevertheless be punished by the courts of that state. See also Johns v.
State, 19 Ind. 421, 81 Am. Dec. 408 (1862).
17. This line of reasoning was used in Simpson v. State, 92 Ga. 41, 43,
17 S.E. 984, 985 (1893), where the court used the following language: "Of
course, the presence of the accused within this state is essential to make
his act one which is done in this state, but the presence need not be actual.
It may be constructive. . . . the act of the accused did take effect in this
state. He started across the river with his leaden messenger, and was op-
erating it up to the moment when it ceased to move and was therefore, in
a legal sense, after the ball crossed the state line, up to the moment it
stopped, in Georgia."
See also State v. Chapin, 17 Ark. 561, 65 Am. Dec. 452 (1856); Johns v.
State, 19 Ind. 421, 81 Am. Dec. 408 (1862); People v. Adams, 3 Denio (N.Y.)
190, 45 Am. Dec. 468 (1846); State v. Hall, 114 N.C. 909, 19 S.E. 602 (1894);.
Ex parte Rogers, 10 Tex. Ct. App. 655, 38 Am. Rep. 654 (1881); State v.
Piver, 74 Wash. 96, 132 Pac. 858 (1913).
18. People v. Botkin, 132 Calif. 231, 64 Pac. 286 (1901).
19. People v. Adams, 3 Denio (N.Y.) 190, 45 Am. Dec. 468 (1846).
20. State v. Piver, 74 Wash. 96, 132 Pac. 858 (1913).
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common law courts have held that the crime is completed where
the act is consummated and not necessarily where it is initiated.2 1
Thus, in our hypothetical situation, in the absence of a spe-
cific statutory provision,22 the actor may be punished in Texas
where the bullet struck the victim's body, but it is questionable
whether or not he may be punished in Louisiana where the bullet
was set in motion unless specific legislation be enacted to cover
this situation.
It is submitted that both these states have sufficient connec-
tion with the homicide to assume jurisdiction, and might, by
statute, provide for the apprehension and punishment of the
offender. To provide for this exceptional situation, many states
have enacted statutes conferring jurisdiction upon their courts
when the offender and the victim are in different jurisdictions.
These statutes may be divided into three types: First, those based
on the so-called "subjective principle," that is, when a person is
in one state and sets an object in motion which takes effect in a
second state,23 the courts of the first state (Louisiana in our hypo-
thetical case), are given jurisdiction over the offender.2 4 The
second type of statute adopts the "objective principle," providing
that where a force is set in motion outside the state and is con-
summated within the state, the courts of the state where the
crime was consummated (Texas in our hypothetical case) have
jurisdiction. 25 The third is more sweeping, making punishable
21. Simpson v. State, 92 Ga. 41, 17 S.E. 984 (1893); State v. Hall, 114
N.C. 909, 19 S.E. 602 (1894).
22. In State v. Brown, 172 La. 49, 50, 133 So. 358, 359 (1931), it was said:
"As a Code of Criminal Procedure, it does not embody all the rules of
pleading, practice and procedure that are applicable to the trial of criminal
cases. Many of these rules are not embraced in the code and will be found
in the Revised Statutes, in the Acts of the Legislature, in the common law
and the jurisprudence."
23. Statutes covering this situation may be found in Alabama: Ala. Code
(1940) tit. 15, § 93; Arizona: Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) § 44-1101; Florida: Fla.
Stat. Ann. (1944) § 932.07; Indiana: Ind. Stat. (Burns, 1933) § 9-216; Missis-
sippi: Miss. Code Ann. (1942) tit. 11, § 2428; North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat.
(1943) c. 15, § 132 [passed in 1895 as a result of the decision in State v.
Hall, 114 N.C. 909, 19 S.E. 602 (1894)J; Ohio: Ohio Code Ann. (Page, 1939)
§ 13426-5; South Carolina: S.C. Code of Laws (1942) § 1018 (This section
covers the case where either the object was set in motion inside the state
and took effect outside the state, or where it was set in motion outside, and
took effect within the state.); Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. (Williams, 1934)
§ 11474; Texas: Texas Ann. Code Crim. Proc. (Vernon, 1925) art. 192.
24. People v. Botkin, 132 Calif. 231, 64 Pac. 286 (1901).
25. Similar statutes may be found in Alabama: Ala. Code (1940) tit. 15,
§ 92; Arizona: Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) § 44-1102; California: Calif. Penal
Code (Deering, 1931) § 778; Idaho: Idaho Code (1947) § 19-302; Illinois: Ill.
Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) § 38-709; Indiana: Ind. Ann. Stat. (Burns,
1933) § 9-203; Iowa: Iowa Code (1946) § 753-3; Mississippi: Miss. Code Ann.
(1942) tit. 11, c. 2, § 2427; Montana: Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. (1935) c. 64,
§ 11704; North Dakota: N.D. Rev. Code (1943) c. 29-03, § 0301; Ohio: Ohio
1949]
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any person who commits within a state any crime in whole or in
part. 26 In effect, this latter type of statute declares that if any of
the substantial constituent elements of an offense occur within
the state jurisdiction over the whole offense exists. Such a statute
would serve as the basis for the assumption by either Louisiana
or Texas of jurisdiction over the murderer. California has adopted
this type of statute, and its constitutionality has been upheld.
27
The next question is whether the offender could be tried and
convicted in Arkansas where the victim died. It would appear
at first glance that the courts of the state where the death oc-
curred have jurisdiction since the very essence of murder is
death. The courts which have been confronted with this problem
have been disturbed by the fact that no part of the defendant's
act occurs at the place of the death; and in the absence of specific
statutory provisions, they have refused to take jurisdiction in a
case of this kind.28
Several states have enacted statutes providing that when the
fatal blow is inflicted in one state and the victim dies in another,
the offender may be punished in the state in which the death
occurs. 29 It has been argued that these statutes contravene the
defendant's constitutional right to be tried at the place where
the crime is committed.30 A person may be wounded in one state
and wander across the nation before he finally -dies of the wound.
Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1939) § 13426-4; Oklahoma: Okla. Stat. Ann. (1937)
tit. 22, § 121; Oregon: Ore. Comp. Laws (1940) § 26-302; South Dakota: S.D.
Code (1939) § 34-0801; Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. (Williams, 1934) § 11473;
Texas: Texas Ann. Code Crim. Proc. (Vernon, 1925) art. 193; Utah: Utah
Code Ann. (1943) § 105-8-1.
26. A statute covering this factual situation may be found in California:
Calif. Penal Code (Deering, 1931) § 778a.
27. People v. Botkin, 132 Calif. 231, 64 Pac. 286 (1901).
28. State v. Carter, 27 N.J. Law 499 (1859); Riley v. State, 9 Tenn. 438
(1849); Maine v. Kelly, 76 Maine 331 (1884); Ex parte McNeely, 36 W.Va.
84, 14 S.E. 436 (1892).
During the latter part of the fifteenth century, the English courts car-
ried the idea of circumscribed power of the courts over crime so far as to
hold that if a blow was struck in one county and the death ensued in an-
other county from the effects thereof, the criminal could not be punished
in either. This necessarily followed from the rule that the grand jury in
neither county could take cognizance of facts occurring in the other. Be-
cause of this troublesome question of extraterritorial jurisdiction Statutes
2 and 3 of Edward VI were enacted in 1548. These statutes gave jurisdiction
to both the county in which the blow was received and the one in which the
death ensued.
29. Georgia: Ga. Code Ann. (1935) § 27-1105; Louisiana: Art. 16, La. Code
of Crim. Proc. of 1928; Maine: Me. Rev. Stat. (1944) c. 132, § 6; Massachu-
setts: Mass. Ann. Laws (1933) c. 277, § 61; Minnesota: Minn. Stat. Ann.
(1945) § 627.09; New Mexico: N.M. Stat. Ann. (1941) § 42-801; Oregon: Ore.
Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) 26-303; West Virginia: W.Va. Code (1943) § 5921.
30. U. S. Const. Art. III; Commonwealth v. MacLoon, 101 Mass. 1, 100
Am. Dec. 89 (1869); Ex parte McNeely, 36 W.Va. 84, 14 S.E. 436 (1892).
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Nevertheless, the state in which the death occurs could try the
offender if it has a statute of the type last mentioned. Here the
action of the victim rather than that of the defendant determines
the jurisdiction. Such arguments against the constitutionality of
these statutes have been unavailing, for the state in which the
death occurred is deemed to have sufficient connection with the
crime to justify its assumption of jurisdiction.8 1
Assuming that each of the states, Louisiana, Texas and Ar-
kansas has a broad jurisdictional statute conferring jurisdiction
upon their courts when any basic element of a crime occurs
within its boundaries, the question arises as to whether the de-
fendant could successfully plead former jeopardy if he had been
tried in one state and was later placed on trial in a state in which
another of the basic elements of the crime occurred. Under a
statute providing for criminal jurisdiction where any basic ele-
ment of the homicide occurs, a separate and distinct crime of
murder is deemed to have been committed against the law of
each state where such an element of the crime is to be found.
Therefore a plea of former jeopardy would meet with no suc-
cess.
3 2
The situation embraced here is one that does not occur fre-
quently, but when this problem does arise, Louisiana courts
should be armed with legislative authority to bring the offender
to justice. To achieve this purpose it is submitted that Article 16
of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure be amended to read
as follows:
Article 16: A criminal homicide is deemed to have been com-
mitted in Louisiana if:
1. The defendant was in this state when he committed the
act causing the death; or
2. The defendant's act took effect on the victim in this
state, or
3. The victim died in this state.
If any one of these elements occurs in Louisiana, the courts
of this state shall have jurisdiction to try and punish the of-
fender, and it shall be immaterial that the other elements
of the crime may have occurred in some other state.
SIDNEY E. COOK
31. Ibid.
32. Marshall v. State of Nebraska, 6 Neb. 120, 29 Am. Rep. 363 (1877);
Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. 13, 14 L.Ed. 306 (1852); 1 Bishop, Criminal Law
(1923) § 986; 22 C.J.S. 450.
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